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INTRODUCTION
Responding to Derek Bok's reservation about the extent of non-
productive resources expended on and by lawyers,1 Ronald Gilson de-
velops a novel view of attorneys as "transaction cost engineers."2 He
argues that in a world where transactions are costly to execute, an
attorney adds value to economic enterprises by structuring them in a
way that reduces transaction costs. In short, the lawyer "devise[s] effi-
cient mechanisms which bridge the gap between capital asset pricing
theory's hypothetical world of perfect markets and the less-than-per-
fect reality of effecting transactions in this world."3
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin-Madison. B.A., 1975, Tufts University;
J.D., 1981, University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D., 1981, University of Pennsylvania.
This Article and a companion study, Relational Contracting, Transaction Cost
Economics, And The Governance of HMOs 59 TEMP. L.Q. - (1986), are part of an
ongoing study of the organization of physician's and other professional's offices.
This study has benefited from the generous support of the Graduate School Re-
search Fund of the University of Wisconsin.
1. Bok, The President's Report to the Board of Overseers of Harvard University for
1981-1982, reprinted in 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570 (1983).
2. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94
YALE L.J. 239 (1984).
3. Id. at 255.
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To illustrate his point, Gilson presents a model of a relatively dis-
crete exchange, the acquisition of a company. Though the contracting
is complex and often long-term, there are finite limits to the expected
duration of the underlying relationship. In his framework, the lawyer
adds value by devising contract terms that overcome problems related
to the fact that parties have different expectations of a future none
can foresee and that people cannot always be trusted to act in good
faith.
Where the relationship between the contracting parties is no
longer discrete, the parties will often require more than an "efficient"
contract to govern their relationship. I argue that it will in fact re-
quire the development of private orderings.4 In this Article I extend
Gilson's analysis to the continuing relations required to form a health
maintenance organization (HIO) by contract, and I suggest why, in
this context, transaction cost engineering demands more than clever
drafting.
Traditionally, American medicine has been fee-for-service based;
that is, the patient pays the individual physician for services rendered.
If the patient carries health insurance he pays periodic premiums to
the insurer who then either reimburses the insured or pays the physi-
cian for the services rendered. The insurance company and the care
provider are independent entities brought together by the need to pro-
vide services to the same patient. By contrast, an HIO, in return for a
set fee per time period, actually provides a broad spectrum of medical
services directly to the patients. The fee prepaid by the patient is
fixed, irrespective of actual services used, thereby providing health
care providers an incentive to reduce costs. Thus the IMO is an insur-
ance company that, unlike the conventional insurer that reimburses a
patient for his medical expenses, provides the actual medical services.
This Article is concerned with the organization of the medical serv-
ices provided by the HIO and how the lawyer can help the parties to
understand the complexity of the contracting. In particular I intro-
duce the reader to transaction cost economics and illustrate how an
attorney can use it to assess the viability of using contract as the orga-
nizational structure for the delivery of medical services to an HIO.
This Article begins with the assumption that the decision to form
an HIO has already been made. In a world of increasing complexity,
information growth, and technological change, no individual physician
is capable of providing the full range of services potentially required
by a patient. To offer comprehensive service, the HMO must integrate
both horizontally5 and vertically6 the skills of a wide range of physi-
4. Palay, Relational Contracting, Transaction Cost Economics, and The Governance
of liMOs, 59 TEMip. L.Q. - (1986).
5. Horizontal relationships involve doctors who share similar skills, training and ex-
pertise. For instance, a pediatrician might want to be associated with several
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cians. There are two principal methods of integrating the required
physician skills.
The more traditional method is to merge the physician services
into a single firm. Both the group practice HMO and staff model
HMO use this approach. In both instances physicians are combined
financially, administratively, and physically into one vertically and
horizontally integrated medical practice (firm); in most instances the
doctors share a single building, support staff, laboratory, and diagnos-
tic service. 7 As I use the terms, the group practice and the staff model
differ from each other in the physicians' relationship to the firm.
With the group practice model, the doctors maintain (or expect in the
future to have) an ownership interest in the medical practice. Thus
they have a proprietary claim on the stream of profits or losses flow-
ing from the firm. With the staff model, the physicians are employees
of the HIO and do not possess the same ownership interests.
Alternatively, the integration can be accomplished through con-
tract. An independent practitioners association (IPA), for instance,
uses this technique. An IPA is an administrative entity to which inde-
pendently affiliated physicians with geographically dispersed practices
have agreed to provide services. The IPA then sells the collective
product of the doctors to an HMO. Thus the IPA is a set of contracts
between unaffiliated physicians who want to integrate some portion of
their total product without physically merging their various practices
into a centralized firm. The contractual relationship between the par-
ties is necessarily long-term and complex. But at least in theory, the
contracting approach permits the physician to maintain a high degree
of professional autonomy and independence while still participating in
the market for HIO benefits.
My specific interest is with this second method of integration. In
particular I use transaction cost economics to examine the efficacy of
using an IPA to provide medical services under contract to an HMO. I
argue below that an IPA is a viable method of organizing the delivery
of HMO medical services, but only if the parties employ a "proper"
governance structure.
other pediatricians. This type of association might be used to provide coverage
over certain periods of time (like every third weekend), or alternatively, it might
entail consulting on cases, providing second opinions, exchanging information,
and sharing expertise.
6. Vertical relationships are those between physicians with different expertise. The
motivation to enter into these relationships might include anything from the
need to consult with a specialist, to a recommendation that a patient see a particu-
lar doctor, to a network of referrals from primary care physicians. For example,
an internist whose patient has cancer might need to consult with or recommend a
particular oncologist.
7. Increasingly, however, group practice physicians are finding an attraction to sat-
ellite clinics.
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By governance structure I am referring to the mechanism that par-
ties develop or otherwise acquire to monitor, adapt and enforce their
contractual relations. There are a wide variety of governance mecha-
nisms available to parties who desire to project exchanges into the fu-
ture. Internal organization, courts, regulatory bodies, markets, and
private orderings all can provide the necessary help under the correct
circumstances. A "proper" governance structure is one that is cor-
rectly matched to a given set of underlying transactions. Transaction
cost economics, which I discuss below, suggests that in this instance a
correct matching requires a careful, microanalytic examination of the
physician transactions that make up the IPA.
I argue below that a proper governance structure for the complex
physician contracting relationships that comprise an IPA requires the
parties to use a "private ordering."s That is, the governance arrange-
ments used to handle the wide range of (potential) contracting
problems must be internally derived and created by the parties them-
selves for the particular set of transactions at hand. More generally
applicable governance methods, markets or courts for example, will
not work effectively. One can predict that if an IPA relies on these
governance systems, i.e., markets plus courts, it will encounter serious
economic difficulties.
Ironically, what I term a "proper" governance structure requires
that the participating physicians give up at least some of the autonomy
they anticipated retaining. The result is that a well functioning IPA
will differ from the group practice more in degree than in kind. An
attorney advising a client or drafting an agreement must recognize
this in order to best serve the interests of his client.
I begin the next section with a brief description of the governance
structure that doctors and lawyers often believe will be adequate to
handle IPA contracting. I refer to this arrangement as a "general pur-
pose" governance structure and I use it to establish a point of contrast.
In section III I then introduce the reader to transaction cost economics
and identify the very limited set of conditions under which a general
purpose governance structure will be successful. Section IV argues
that the contracting world of physicians fails to meet the assumptions
required for general purpose governance and therefore will prove in-
adequate. Instead the parties will require a more customized institu-
tional arrangement-a private ordering. Section V briefly describes
some of the attributes required of an IPA governance structure. In
8. I take this term from Galanter, though I operationalize it in a somewhat different
manner than he does. Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms, Courts, Private Order-
ings, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1981). Elsewhere I have
referred to what I call "private orderings" as "specialized governance." As far as
I am concerned, the words are interchangeable, but the former has a little more
intuitive appeal.
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section VI I note that a "proper" IPA governance structure will not
differ as much as many imagine from the arrangements supporting a
group practice. This in turn implies that while the IPA, if governed
properly, is a viable method of organizing an HMO, the member physi-
cians must be prepared to give up a significant degree of autonomy.
II. GENERAL PURPOSE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
Many physicians, and often their attorneys, venture into the for-
mation of an IPA with the same objectives and expectations they
would possess in any arms-length contracting. Their primary objec-
tive is to devise a comprehensive agreement. In this instance that con-
tract, at a minimum, must specify (1) the services to be provided by
each physician; (2) a minimum expected quality level; (3) a budget
constraint; (4) a compensation formula; and (5) an arrangement for
acquiring, paying for and sharing long-lived capital assets. An attempt
might be made at the outset to anticipate and handle potential
problems, but often little consideration is given to how the parties will
monitor, adapt, and enforce the agreement once executed. Under
these circumstances the physicians implicitly have assumed that fi-
nancial considerations will align incentives to everyone's mutual inter-
est. If somehow financial concerns fail in their intended role the
doctors expect to end up in court. In other words, the parties implic-
itly anticipate that their agreement will be regulated by some combi-
nation of markets and courts.
I refer to governance structures of this nature as "general purpose"
arrangements. They are general in the sense that they are relatively
accessible to any who want to employ them and are always external to
the basic transaction in question. That is, the parties to the transac-
tion do not expend resources to develop or refine the governance ar-
rangements, though of course they might make expenditures to use
the structures. Similarly, the parties to the transaction do not control
the processes, deliberation or, to a large extent, the outcomes of a gen-
eral purpose governance structure.
United Healthcare (UHC),9 an HMO organized by the SAFECO In-
surance Company, attempted to employ a governance structure that I
classify as generally applicable.10 UHC was organized during the
9. My discussion of United Healthcare is based on two excellent and detailed reports
chronicling its development and demise. DEP'T OF HEALTH SERVS., UNIV. OF
WASH., A CASE STUDY OF UNITED HEALTHCARE, THE SAFECO PLAN (1984) [herein-
after cited as THE SAFECO PLAN]; and DEP'T OF HEALTH SERVS., UNIV. OF WASH.,
CONSUMER CHOICE AND COST CONTAINMENT: AN EVALUATION OF SAFECO'S
UNITED HEALTHCARE PLAN vols. I & II (1982) [hereinafter cited as COST
CONTAINMENT].
10. To be sure, UHC in its last year, attempted to transform its governance structure.
THE SAFECO PLAN, supra note 9, at 115-52 and 222-27.
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1970s as an independent practitioners association. Unlike a more
traditional IPA, UHC contracted only with primary care providers
(PCPs)-general practitioners, family physicians, internists, pediatri-
cians, and some obstetrician/gynecologists. The primary care provid-
ers were to act as gatekeepers who, by managing and regulating the
patient's access to specialists, emergency department use, and hospi-
talization, were to control the health care costs of their patients. An
account was set up for each physician and a percentage of the premi-
ums paid by her patients was deposited to it each month. The account
was used to compensate the physician for the services she provided the
patient and to reimburse hospitals and specialists. The primary care
provider's compensation was based on either a discounted fee-for-ser-
vice or a per capita basis, depending upon how many HIO members
were in the physician's panel. Hospitals and specialists, neither of
whom had contracts with UHC, were reimbursed 100% of their
charges.
Specifically, UHC used three mechanisms to enforce the primary
care provider's obligation to minimize costs. First, the PCP was re-
quired to review and approve each bill submitted by the hospital or
specialist. Second, the primary care physicians were placed at finan-
cial risk for any deficit in their account at the end of the year.11 Fi-
nally, UHC periodically exercised its right to remove a PCP from the
plan.
Of the three enforcement mechanisms, SAFECO believed that the
second was the most important.12 Thus, the plan's creators believed
that the market oriented, financial incentives built into the initial con-
tract would provide the necessary enforcement mechanism. Inter-
nally generated procedures or norms were given little consideration
until 1981, one year prior to UHC's closing. Until that time, the HIMO
employed neither concurrent nor retrospective utilization review and
did not mandate second opinions or preadmission authorization. As
the study stated:
United Healthcare by intent had no monitoring or utilization review system
during most years of its operation. It was the opinion of UH management that
the gatekeeper or case management approach, if used properly, would negate
the use of utilization review. Concurrent hospitalization review was begun
after high hospital costs were noted in 1979.13
11. The physician shared 50% of the deficit or surplus with UHC, up to a maximum
of 10% of her own fee-for-service revenues for UHC enrollees. In a panel of 200
or more patients where the PCP was paid a fixed sum per capita for her services,
the PCP's maximum share of the surplus was increased from 10 to 50% of her
fee-for-service revenue from UHC and the share of any deficit was decreased
from 10 to 5% of that revenue. COST CONTAINMENT, supra note 9, at 48.
12. "Safeco was convinced that the incentives offered to physicians were the reason
for lower costs in closed-panel HMOs." COST CONTAnMENT, supra note 9, at 49.
13. THE SAFECO PLAN, supra note 9, at 110.
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Thus, the penalty and reward structure used to enforce the UHC
contract was derived from sources outside the intra-physician transac-
tions. Individual self-interest, market substitutes, rules of profes-
sional conduct, and traditional tort or contract remedies provided the
primary sources of enforcement incentives. Hierarchy played no im-
portant role. To the extent incentives were intrinsic to the original
contracting, they tended to be financially oriented and derived during
the initial contracting stage. Where incentives are financially oriented
the parties are relying fundamentally upon the existence of markets
to guarantee their agreement.
The method of monitoring the agreements between UHC physi-
cians revealed similar characteristics. Principal responsibility for
monitoring was placed on the physician's financial incentives to com-
ply with the plan's cost objectives. That is, parties were assumed to
self-monitor because it would not be in their financial best interest to
do otherwise. Thus monitoring was handled extrinsic to the basic phy-
sician transaction. The parties either relied upon outside institutions,
like markets, to monitor the agreement or they did no monitoring.
The organizers assumed that the terms of the agreement would be in
the best interests of the physician. They believed that the doctor
would realize that through her failure to comply with quality or cost
standards the IPA might fail, she might lose patients and income, or
the IPA might ask her to leave.
Further evidence of extrinsic sources of monitoring can be found in
the heavy reliance that was placed on hospital and professional stan-
dards review organization (PSRO)'4 oversight of the quantity and the
quality of a physician's services. In addition, little prospective moni-
toring was done. That is, there was virtually no attempt to screen pro-
spective physicians for desirable characteristics. United Healthcare
allowed any physician who wanted to join to do so. In a sense, all pro-
spective monitoring was left to external sources-in this case, medical
schools, residency programs, and licensing boards.
Of course, intrinsic monitoring was never totally absent. One
study of United Healthcare reveals that the physician relations staff
made sporadic checks of hospitalization rates and while the quality of
care was not officially checked, the medical director did examine
claims to identify flagrant abuses.15 In addition information feedback
systems and physician education was minimal. Monthly newsletters
14. Havighurst and Blumstein define PSROs as "[S]elf-regulatory organizations of
physicians which are charged with monitoring individual physicians' decisions af-
fecting the use of health care resources under federal health programs." Havig-
hurst and Blumstein, Coping With Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Medical Care: The
Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 6, 8 (1975). Self-regulatory organizations were
first organized pursuant to provisions of the Social Security Amendments of 1972,
42 U.S.C. § 1320 (Supp. II, 1984).
15. THE SAFECO PLAN, supra note 9, at 111.
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or cost statements were sometimes used to send information to physi-
cians, but it is unclear how much these affected physician practice
habits or whether the doctors even understood them.16 As the study
of UHC found:
Thirty-eight percent of the physicians in the Richardson study said they were
more aware of costs after joining United Healthcare, but sixty-two percent of
the physicians said their awareness of costs had not changed. Furthermore
awareness of costs was not related to length of time in the plan, number of
patients in the plan, or account balance.1 7
III. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS
In October, 1981, the SAFECO Insurance Company decided to ter-
minate its United Healthcare operations. One of the reasons for the
decision was the inability of the HMO to achieve the anticipated cost
savings and utilization control. Though various reasons have been put
forth for the demise of UHCis and other IPAs,'9 none explicitly ac-
counts for transaction cost considerations. Transaction cost theory
suggests that a partial explanation for UHC's and some other IPA's
problems in effectuating utilization controls can be found in their use
of generally applicable governance structures. I argue that govern-
ance structures of this nature are incompatible with the underlying
physician transaction.
An introduction to some of the basic tenets of transaction cost eco-
nomics may be helpful to those unfamiliar with the subject. Transac-
tion cost theory is concerned with the organization of economic
behavior. The theory argues that, all other elements held constant,
economic efficiency requires parties to organize their contracting to
minimize transaction costs. In other words, they will either devise or
choose the least costly governance arrangement that best facilitates
their exchange.
Transaction costs, quite literally, are the "costs of running the eco-
nomic system."20 They are "the economic equivalent of the friction in
16. ML at 108.
17. Id (The Richardson study referred to is the COST CONTAINMENT study, supra
note 9).
18. COST CONTAINMENT, supra note 9; TuE SAFECO PLAN, supra note 9.
19. Principle among the reasons given for IPA and HMO performance have been the
structure, management, and financial incentives of the organization, see H. LuFr,
HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS: DIMENSIONS OF PERFORMANCE 351-80
(1981), mistakes in marketing the plan, lack of widespread exposure of panel phy-
sicians to fiscal risk in the plan, lack of review mechanism for regulating hospital
utilization, adverse selection, and high hospital utilization, see Sorenson, Saward,
& Wersinger, The Demise of an Individual Practice Association: A Case Study of
Health Watch, 17 INQUIRY 244, 250-52 (1980).
20. JOINT ECON. COMM., 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS., THE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES: THE PPB SYSTEM 47,48 (Comm. Print 1969) [hereinafter
cited as THE PPB SYSTEM].
1986]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW V
physical systems" 21 and refer to the human and environmental condi-
tions that make contracting potentially costly. It is the existence of
transaction costs that makes governance structures necessary.
Transaction costs of three types are usefully distinguished. First,
human decisionmakers are only limitedly rational. They seek their
own self interest, and generally prefer more of most things to less of
them. However, they have only a restricted capacity for gathering,
evaluating and storing information. They cannot see the future and
they have only qualified problem solving capabilities. In short, they
possess what Simon terms "bounded rationality."22
Second, human decisionmakers can and do act opportunistically.
On the one hand they attempt to exploit the advantages which may be
attained from the making of "false or empty, that is self-disbelieved
threats and promises" 23 concerning future conduct. On the other
hand, they distort or selectively disclose information.24
Third, the environment in which these actors interact is often un-
certain and complex, thereby causing bounded rationality constraints
to be met. In addition, the world of contract often is populated by only
a small number of potential buyers and sellers. Where the partici-
pants are few, either markets cannot be relied upon to work correctly
or situations akin to monopolistic competition develop. Of special in-
terest to transaction cost economists are those circumstances in which
a large number of buyers and sellers exist at the outset but are re-
duced substantially once initial bargains are set. What appears ini-
tially to have the requisite buyers and sellers for a well functioning
market devolves into some form of monopolistic or "small numbers"
bargaining environment.25
In a world without transaction costs, any governance structure
would be more than adequate for the needs of the parties. More pre-
cisely, in a world where transaction costs are zero, the choice of gov-
ernance structures is irrelevant because, by definition, enforcement,
monitoring, and adaptations are effected costlessly. Hence, a gener-
ally applicable governance structure, consisting of some combination
of markets and courts, would have neither a comparative advantage
nor disadvantage over other imaginable governance structures.26
However, if nontrivial levels of transaction costs are present, gen-
21. 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS,
AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 19 (1985).
22. H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR XXIV (2d ed. 1957); see also H. SIMON,
MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL (1957).
23. E. GOFFMAN, STRATEGIC INTERACTION 105 (1969).
24. 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 21 at 47.
25. 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS & ANTITRUST IMPLICA-
TIONS 29 (1975).
26. THE PPB SYSTEM, supra note 20; 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 21; Coase, The Prob-
lem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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eral purpose governance will usually prove inadequate. The combina-
tion of bounded rationality and complexity/uncertainty severely
limits the ability of parties to draft self-enforcing, once-and-for-all,
contingent claims contracts. The alternative is for the parties to use
"adaptive sequential contracting"-crossing bridges as they are
reached and renegotiating agreements as needed. But contracting of
this nature requires that the parties be able to rely upon their part-
ners' promises to act in good faith at the contract renegotiation or re-
newal stage. The presence of opportunistic conduct means that there
is no a prioi reason to believe in the other parties' promises. If mar-
kets work correctly, the problems would be minimized because one
could always take one's business elsewhere. However, to the extent
that the parties face a world in which small numbers bargaining condi-
tions prevail, markets will fail to exist or will work improperly.
Thus, in a world with transaction costs, parties need to give
thought to the types of governance structures they use. The precise
nature of the governance mechanism is dependent upon those charac-
teristics of the transaction that give rise to the contracting frictions
that, in turn, make contract execution potentially costly. Williamson
argues that the principal determinants of governance choice are
(1) the extent to which investment is transaction-specific, (2) the fre-
quency of exchange, and (3) the level of uncertainty involved.27 Of
the three, he considers the first factor to be the most important. Sim-
ply put, he believes that parties with significant investments in non-
redeployable assets will attempt to govern their exchanges with "pri-
vate orderings"-that is, transaction-specific or customized govern-
ance structures-like firms or relational contracts. Where the capital
investments can be transferred to other uses, the parties are less likely
to incur the costs of private orderings and will tend to use more gen-
eral purpose institutions like courts or markets. The reasoning is
straightforward. The more specialized the investment, the lower its
value in its next best use. Consequently, even if there were a large
number of buyers and sellers at the outset, the number will be greatly
reduced once an actual agreement is reached. Small numbers condi-
tions can raise problems during the performance or renegotiation
stage by heightening the risk of opportunistic behavior. Both sides,
therefore, are willing to make increased expenditures to protect them-
selves against the possibility that the other party will attempt to ex-
ploit her ex post bargaining advantage. These expenditures take the
form of governance mechanisms that are bilateral and unique to the
parties. Conversely, as the investments become more standardized
the parties have less incentive to make extra expenditures on govern-
ance. After all, by definition they have alternative sources of sale or
27. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Rela-
tions, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979).
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supply. Consequently, they are more willing to use the generally ap-
plicable alternatives that already exist.28
IV. THE NATURE OF THE TRANSACTION
The last section used transaction cost economics to argue that a
general purpose governance structure requires either that bounded ra-
tionality constraints not be met, that opportunism not be prevalent, or
that capital investments be redeployable. This section demonstrates
that the contracting world of physicians fails to meet these assump-
tions. In particular, physicians face three types of transaction costs.
First, bounded rationality constraints are met because the world of
physicians is complex and fraught with uncertainty. Initial agree-
ments concerning compensation, work loads, patient allocation, risk
pooling, and capital expenditure require some assessment of the fu-
ture. Yet at the outset of the agreement, physicians are unable to de-
termine whether variables like the demographic characteristics and
tastes of their partners29 or patients will vary over time, and if they do
whether the changes will be significant. Similar difficulties arise in
determining how research and technical change will influence the de-
mand for, and usefulness of, the equipment and physician skills ex-
isting at the time of the initial contracting. Finally, there is the
continuing and very real possibility of unexpected changes in exoge-
nous conditions such as the regulatory, political, or economic
atmosphere.
The uncertainty of the future and the complexity of the agreement
make it impossible at the outset to derive a complete, once-and-for-all
28. Uncertainty increases the importance of devising a mechanism for working out
problems "[s]ince contractual gaps will be larger and the occasions for sequential
adaptations will increase in number and importance as the degree of uncertainty
increases." I& at 254. Consequently, as the degree of uncertainty rises, the use of
elaborate, transaction-specific governance structures increases likewise.
Expected frequency of interaction also influences the institutional choice. Be-
cause governance involves significant set-up costs, the lower the frequency of ex-
change-and consequently the fewer the expected opportunities to avail oneself
of the institutional structure-the more likely the parties are to want to cost-
share. The result will be governance structures usable by a larger number of
parties. Markets and courts, for instance, are excellent examples of generally
applicable institutions. For a given degree of investment specificity, as the fre-
quency of exchange increases-and consequently, the expectation for use of the
governance facilities-the more likely the parties are to be the only users of their
governance structure. Williamson, supra note 27.
29. There is also uncertainty about whether a partner's skills, philosophy, work hab-
its, and personal incentives-such as the physician's "taste" for money-will re-
main constant over the life of the contract. While a doctor might know her
partners' characteristics at the outset, it is not until the execution stage that she
will be able to tell just how skilled, reliable, hard working, avaricious, and easy to
work with the physicians are.
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contract. The alternative is to leave the contract incomplete and fill in
blanks during the execution stage by renegotiating the agreement as
events unfold. For adaptive sequential contracting of this nature to be
effective, a physician must be able to rely upon her partners' promises
to act in "good faith" during renegotiation.
However, there is always that possibility that one's contracting
partners will cheat, break the agreement, or fail to act in good faith at
the renegotiation stage. Professionalism and collegiality notwith-
standing, there is no a prioi reason for a physician to rely more heav-
ily on another doctor's promise than on the word of anyone else. In
the physician context, contract breaches might include the failure to
deliver promised services, quality levels, hours of work, or coverage.
Compensation incentives can help to alleviate these problems, but
only if the parties can specify the conditions that will trigger induce-
ments and then agree that they have occurred. But compensation
agreements of this nature can lead to cheating in the form of patient
"stealing." This can be especially prevalent in a competitive environ-
ment where compensation is based at least in part on a per capita or
fee-for-service basis. Along similar lines, physicians might refuse to
provide services in return for the agreed upon compensation. Physi-
cians in high income specialties such as surgery or radiology often
come to believe that they are subsidizing the primary care doctors.
Whether this is true is irrelevant to my analysis. As long as surgeons
or other specialists perceive it to be true, they are likely to become
unhappy with their existing compensation. They might respond by
demanding more money, unilaterally reducing their case load, or ad-
hering strictly to the letter of their contract. Finally, a physician
might simply impose on her partners more costs in caring for her pa-
tients than she promised. She might spend more time, require more
tests, refer to outside specialists more often, admit patients more read-
ily, or keep them hospitalized longer than she promised.
Of course, to the extent that alternative sources of supply or de-
mand exist, the parties are protected. If a surgeon stops doing what
she promised, her partners can simply replace her. If her colleagues
do not act in good faith when an unexpected contingency arises, she
can leave and find work elsewhere.
Dissolving a partnership is never costless, and this is all the more
true if the parties have made significant investments in nonredeploy-
able, nonrecoverable assets. If for some reason the partnership were
to dissolve, these assets would be difficult to sell. In other words, the
value of these assets in their next best use would be greatly reduced. I
am interested in two types of physician investment. On the one hand,
doctors purchase costly, long-lived capital assets and technology. Even
though there may be buyers for the physical capital, rapid technologi-
cal change, imperfect depreciation, inflation or deflation, valuation
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problems and contentious bargaining can lead to nontrivial transfer
costs. 30
On the other hand, physicians also make significant transaction-
specific investments in human capital. First, they invest in specialized
skills and reputations.31 A physician's reputation provides informa-
tion on her temperament, philosophy and the quality of her work. It
also conveys information to consulting physicians about the quality of
care a patient has received in the past.3 2 In addition, reputation can
provide a ready means of marketing one's assets and differentiating
one's product. They tell other physicians something about how com-
municative, responsive, and sensitive to preexisting doctor-patient re-
lations a colleague is.33 A physician must expend considerable
resources in order to develop and communicate any changes in her
reputation. In this sense, then, the investment in reputation is not
costlessly redeployable. 34
30. Williamson makes a similar point in the context of the transfer of the right to
provide cable television. Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopo-
lies-In General and with Respect to CAT-V, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73 (1976).
31. Formally, the exchanges between doctors, have all the characteristics of what
Satterthwaite defines as a good reputation:
1. Each seller's product is differentiated from every other seller's
product.
2. Product quality is consumer-specific, i.e., one perfectly informed con-
sumer may prefer seller i's product over seller j's product, while a second
perfectly informed consumer may prefer seller j's product over seller i's.
This results from the fact that different consumers value each seller's
product's attributes differently, rather than that different consumers
perceive the attributes of a seller's product differently.
3. The attributes of each seller's product can only be fully evaluated by
experience with the product over a significant length of time.
4. The product is important to consumers, i.e., each consumer is willing
to expend significant effort to find a seller offering a product that is,
according to his particular preferences, of high quality and reasonable
price.
Satterthwaite, Consumer Information, Equilibrium Industry Price, and the
Number of Sellers, 10 BELL J. ECON. 483, 485-86 (1979).
32. In choosing a covering physician or a specialist, doctors are particularly con-
cerned about the quality of the service that will be provided. The quality of their
associates' services reflects upon their judgment, affects the care their patients
receive, has an impact on their work load, and can influence the patient's desire
to remain with the primary care physician or clinic. Thus the primary care physi-
cian will want some assurance that the doctor with whom she has entrusted her
patient has standards, skills, a demeanor, and a philosophy compatible with her
own. She will also want some assurance that she can have confidence in the ad-
vice, information, second opinion or services she is obtaining.
33. Similarly, the covering or referral physician needs to know that her patient has
had an adequate medical work-up and exam. Without this assurance, a second
examination or set of tests might be ordered. Besides the obvious monetary costs
involved in duplication, a reputation for redoing initial work-ups can lead to
bruised egos, legitimate disagreements, and, ultimately, to fewer referrals.
34. Of course, to the extent other physicians are looking for the identical mix of
skills, philosophies, standards, etc., the investment is not perfectly idiosyncratic.
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Second, doctors make nonredeployable human capital investments
in their relationships with their patients. This relationship is com-
monly referred to as the "doctor-patient relationship" and it requires
an investment of both time and resources. 35 In an IMO setting this
relationship is not necessarily redeployable if the doctor were forced
to leave the practice. Quite often, the patient's membership in the
plan will run for a minimum fixed period thus limiting his ability to
change plans and follow the physician.
Physicians also make transaction-specific human capital invest-
ments in administrative functions. For instance, devising a coverage
schedule takes considerable time and effort. Someone has to create,
coordinate, administer, and adjust the schedule. This will require
meetings and the resolution of disputes, especially over complicated
questions of billing. For instance, an understanding will have to be
reached concerning payment for patients admitted to the hospital by a
covering physician.36 These investments in coordination, communica-
tions, and administration would also be lost if the partnership were
dissolved.
But the number of alternatives is limited, because not every doctor will want to
practice with a physician who has a particular mix of attributes. In other words,
investing in a reputation is inevitable and important because it conveys easily
processed information to other physicians. But by the same token, that reputa-
tion locks its owner into a particular designation.
35. Learning about, understanding, and treating a patient's health problems requires
the patient's cooperation. A careful and informed diagnosis of current medical
problems requires an understanding of a patient's history. The doctor makes in-
vestments not only in taking that history, but in reducing it to words and record-
ing it in a manner understandable to herself and to other practitioners. Patients
provide information to doctors imprecisely and in code. The doctor, to be effec-
tive, must learn to read that code. Similarly, the physician must learn whether
she can rely on the patient's information. For instance, how likely is it that the
patient complaining of a particular problem actually has it. She also needs to
determine just how much information the patient can handle. The doctor also
makes investments in the doctor-patient relationship to ensure desirable reputa-
tion effects. Finally, whether a patient continues on a prescribed regimen of
medication, diet, exercise, or the like, depends in part on the degree to which she
trusts the doctor's diagnosis and judgment. As Mechanic points out,
the effectiveness of medical care depends on the patient's cooperation.
The patient must be able and willing to provide information, to conform
with medical advice, to return to the physician, to take medication prop-
erly, and to carry out numerous other tasks. Failures in communication
and empathy not only harm a vital function of medical care, but also
diminish the opportunities for technical quality and effectiveness.
D. MEcHANic, THE GRowTH OF BuREAucRATIc MEDICINE 11 (1976).
36. The general rule is that the patient is the patient of the admitting physician. But
what happens when the admitting physician does little more than simply sign
someone else's pre-existing patient into the hospital? Who retains responsibility
for the care and receives the primary billing?
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V. THE REQUIRED GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
Section III argued that transaction costs of the nature described in
section IV preclude supporting the physician contract with generally
applicable governance structures and instead require a private order-
ing. This section illustrates what is meant by the term "private order-
ing." The required governance structure is not described in complete
detail here; rather, the concept is illustrated to help an attorney in his
role as a transaction cost engineer.
By the term "private ordering" I am referring to a specialized gov-
ernance structure that is internal37 and is customized to the transac-
tion.3 8 The primary purpose of the arrangement is to foster
cooperative and adaptive behavior. Internal organization, vertical in-
tegration, and hierarchy-all characteristics of the group practice-
are typical examples of specialized governance structures.3 9 Properly
conceived, the governance structure of the IPA can achieve similar
results. Where the group practice relies upon the geographic proxim-
ity of the participating physicians to foster social cohesion, a team-ori-
entation, informal interaction, interdependence, and hierarchy, the
IPA must find specialized governance through "quasi-integration"--
that is through a contractual relationship where nominally independ-
ent parties are so closely related that they approximate a vertically
integrated enterprise.40
37. This is not to say that a governance structure must be internally generated to be
transaction-specific. One could imagine an external agency of some sort that spe-
cialized in enforcing only a certain class of transactions. Williamson, supra note
30, offers the infrequency of interaction as one explanation for why parties to
transactions involving idiosyncratic capital might want specialized, external agen-
cies to develop. Regulatory agencies like the Federal Communications Commis-
sion or the Interstate Commerce Commission might be classified as specialized.
However, because a large number of similar, yet different, transactions must be
handled by an agency of this sort, they are relatively less transaction-specific than
governance structures that are derived by the parties themselves. In fact, parties
to transactions involving idiosyncratic investments find that even specialized
agencies are inadequate and, therefore, look for means to avoid their auspices.
Palay, Avoiding Regulatory Constraints: Contracting Safeguards and the Role of
Informal Agreements, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 155 (1985). My point, then,
is that the existence of an internally generated governance structure indicates
transaction-specificity. The reverse need not be true.
38. Not only does this indicate the degree to which the transaction remains autono-
mous from outside governance, but internally generated incentive systems are
not easily transferred to other parties or exchanges. Thus they are indicative of a
transaction-specific governance structure.
39. 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 21.
40. See, e.g., Blois, Vertical Quasi-Integration, 20 J. IND. ECON. 253 (1972); Blois, Sup-
ply Contracts in the Galbraithian Planning System, 24 J. IND. ECON. 29 (1975);
Kessler & Stern, Competition, Contract; and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1
(1959); Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents,
and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. ECON. 297 (1978).
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Take for instance the IPA governance structure required to en-
force and monitor physician agreements on hospital, laboratory, and
medical services utilization. 41 Rather than rely upon markets and
courts to enforce the agreement on utilization, the parties will need to
develop and monitor a penalty and reward structure that combines
formalized peer interactions with expressed norms. The former refers
to the joint decision-making, consultation, meetings, review activities,
and overall reinforcement and scrutiny that constitutes the environ-
ment within which the physician works.42 Geographic dispersion, in-
frequent physician contact, and a strong countervailing physician
desire to maintain autonomy results in a less cohesive and homogene-
ous underlying social structure than in the group practice. Thus,
where peer interaction in the group practice can be carried out "in the
halls" or while "sharing charts,"43 the IPA requires relatively regular-
ized and scheduled meetings, peer review proceedings, and adminis-
trative procedures. Because meetings take up relatively large blocks
of time investments in the peer incentive structure of the IPA might
appear to be greater than in the group setting. However, once one
adds up all the time spent on informal social control in the group set-
ting, the differences in the size of the investments in peer interactions
is likely to prove illusory.
To develop an internalized enforcement mechanism, the parties
will also need to emphasize the development of administratively de-
vised rules and procedures. For instance, the IPA will need to employ
some combination of administrative controls on admissions by outside
specialists, referral controls, hospital utilization review, concurrent re-
view, retrospective review, discharge planning, and mandatory second
opinions. The objective will be to modify physician practice patterns
by reminding the doctor of the need to be cost conscious. For the most
part these administratively devised norms are a means of communicat-
ing standards and establishing benchmarks of behavior. For instance,
outside referrals to specialists not affiliated with the HIO can be par-
ticularly costly. Both the direct fees charged by the specialists and the
potential lack of control on hospital admissions can constitute a signif-
41. In the past I have found it quite useful to also examine how parties adapt their
contracts to changed circumstances. Palay, Comparative Institutional Econom-
ics: The Governance of Rail Freight Contracting, 13 J.L. STUD. 265 (1984)). How-
ever, the present data is such that meaningful descriptions of adaptations are
impossible.
42. G. MEIER & J. TILLoTSON, PHYsIcIAN REIMBURSEMENT AND HosPrrAL USE IN
HMOs (1978) 73, 75 & app. B.
43. In the group practice, peer interaction is much more informal than that required
by IPAs. Interactions can occur naturally in the course of watching what others
do, through contacts in the hall, over lunch, through conversations in the doctors'
lounge, or similar unstructured activities. Real resources are expended both in
developing the trust relationships required by an informal process and in the nu-
merous small blocks of time used for consultations and the like.
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icant drain on revenues. HlMOs often use a variety of controls to cause
the physician to think carefully about whether the referral is war-
ranted. The most common method is to require a physician to get the
medical director's approval before making an outside referral. Simi-
larly, HMOs use a variety of controls to limit hospital admissions by
outside physicians. For instance, the department director might first
screen referral admission for urgency. Those that are classified as
elective would then have to be approved by the medical director.44
Of course, often the real incentive to adhere to utilization stan-
dards comes not from the administrative procedures, but from the
sanctions-also internally derived-associated with noncompliance.
For instance, InterStudy reports:
The New Mexico Health Care Corporation, with 375 participating physicians,
could not rely on social structure to maintain cost-effective orientation. The
HMO retained a comprehensive assemblage of control mechanisms and did
not hesitate to enforce them, regardless of the severity, whenever it appeared
warranted.
4 5
The incentives can take one of several forms. Some involve monetary
penalties especially, for example, where the physicians are put at per-
sonal risk for a percentage of the HMO's revenue shortfall. Other
penalties include denying payments for care considered unnecessary
or inappropriate. Often the mere questioning of an occasional bill,
without actually denying payment, is enough to remind physicians to
be more cost conscious in the future.46 Others sanctions are related to
the social stigma of being the only one in an association who is not
meeting some standard. Still others involve terminating physicians
who consistently fail to adhere to agreements on utilization.
Using formal norms as an incentive for enforcement is particularly
important for IPAs. Unlike the group practice, IPAs cannot rely upon
close geographic proximity to foster social cohesiveness and frequent
communication. Thus, there is a greater emphasis on carefully de-
lineating rules and codifying accepted practices as a means of commu-
nicating the norms and modifying utilization and admissions behavior.
After studying nine HMOs, InterStudy concluded:
As is true with preadmission certification, formal concurrent review programs
are likely to be more effective in an IPA setting, where practice patterns vary
widely among physicians and the physician/HMO interaction may be less fre-
quent. Concurrent review can occur informally in group practice settings,
where physicians commonly discuss hospital cases; a formal concurrent review
program may add little. The larger and less interactive the group becomes,
the more effective a formal program may be. Of the five HMOs employing
concurrent review, Health Maintenance Plan/Cincinnati was the only group
practice; here the review portion was viewed as a program of major
44. G. MEIER & J. TILLOTSON, supra note 42, at 56.
45. Id at 76.
46. Id. at B-7.
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importance.4 7
This is not to say that group practices do not establish utilization
norms, but that they are likely to be less important than those found
in an IPA.
To effectively support a long-term contractual relation, a govern-
ance structure must provide information concerning the status of
transactions and the behavior of contracting parties. The data is re-
quired both to promote planning and ensure compliance. I refer to
this data gathering and processing function as monitoring. The degree
to which the parties to the transaction gather, process and act upon
the relevant information, rather than rely upon others, helps to deter-
mine whether the monitoring is indicative of a private ordering. As
with enforcement, intrinsic monitoring processes are not easily trans-
ferred to other settings and, therefore, indicate transaction-specific
governance.
To generate the requisite information, an IPA will need a formal-
ized, sophisticated, and technically complex feedback system. The
Franklin Area Health Plan (FAHP)-a Maine based IPA-provides
an example of one such system. First, a committee conducted an ex
post review of the admissions practices and ambulatory care patterns
of the participating physicians. A series of HMO and individual physi-
cian performance indicators were generated from the review. This in-
formation was both transmitted directly to the doctors and used in
internal enforcement proceedings.48 Besides the formal retrospective
review, FAHP also generated and processed informal information on
concurrent review. For instance, the medical director received a con-
tinuous flow of updated data on current hospitalizations. He would
review and discuss the cases with the admitting physician in an effort
to minimize unnecessary hospital days.49
As might be expected, the continuous interaction among group
practice members reduces the value to them of sophisticated informa-
tion systems. Consequently, one would expect the group practice to
spend less resources on formal feedback and education. Instead, moni-
toring resources would be expended in the form of time spent on such
activities as peer supervision and "chatting in the corridor." Hard data
would be used both to "validate impressions" and to identify trends
and problem areas.5 0
Some monitoring can be achieved prospectively by choosing care-
fully the physicians with whom to contract, thereby reducing the fu-
ture need to do compliance monitoring. Historically, the group
practices have been more successful at screening and selecting physi-
47. AL at 76.
48. IM at B-7.
49. IM at 58.
50. Id- at B-7.
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cians than have IPAs. The latter have faced competing objectives:
containing costs by carefully selecting of physicians while broadening
the patient base by maximizing the number of participating physi-
cians. For marketing reasons, they have tended to reconcile these
objectives in favor of broader participation. Thus IPAs tend to be less
selective in choosing physicians and are often forced by their or-
ganizers (especially where these are the local medical society) to ac-
cept any physician who applies. This can mean having to hire
physicians who are high utilizers or are not cost effective. There are
exceptions to this tendency and there are IPAs with successful physi-
cian selection programs. For instance, at the New Mexico Health Care
Corporation, there is an annual review of each physician's cost and
quality of care record. The IPA requires the review as part of its reap-
pointment procedures and providers have been refused reappointment
in the past.51 But in general, the IPAs have required more sophisti-
cated information feedback systems to compensate for inadequate pro-
spective monitoring.
VI. IPA VERSUS GROUP PRACTICE GOVERNANCE
STRUCTURES
Throughout the previous section I implicitly argued that transac-
tion-specific governance could be defined in terms of the extent to
which governance tasks are handled internally by the parties to the
transaction. Ironically, this makes the successful IPA and the group
practice HIO quite similar.52 Both must develop their own transac-
tion-specific governance structures. To be sure, there are differences
between the two types of HIOs. But those differences tend to be a
product of the variations in the communications and social structure
developed by the two organizations. The group practice can take ad-
vantage of close physician proximity to foster a strong social structure
and communication network. This in turn permits interactions to be
more informal and norms to be established by example rather than by
fiat, though the impact of hierarchy and a powerful medical director
must not be discounted. The IPA, however, must rely more heavily
upon formal processes, meetings, and rules. But the differences wit-
nessed between the IPA and the group tend to be more in degree than
in kind.53 Despite the evident differences in organizational form, the
IPA and the group practice are both capable of providing similar gov-
ernance structures for physicians practicing in an HMO setting. Both
governance structures are transaction-specific and permit the parties
to maintain fundamental control over their governance arrangements.
51. Id at 58.
52. Palay, supra note 37.
53. Id
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This would not be true if a general purpose governance structure were
used.
To put the point a different way, it is possible to develop an inter-
nalized governance structure even if the parties choose not to organize
themselves as a firm. Parties that are more loosely associated-as in
an IPA-can effectively develop the necessary governance mecha-
nism, but only if they are prepared to become quasi-integrated. Of
course, one of the attributes of quasi-integration is that the contracting
parties, in varying degrees, give up their autonomy of action. They
agree, more or less, to subordinate their individual interests to their
joint interests. This w11 certainly have an impact on a physician's
HMO practice patterns. But in addition, to the extent a physician is
unprepared to maintain two practice patterns-one for the HMO and
one for her other patients-her non-HIO health care services will
also be influenced. Thus, physicians who want to participate in an
IMO must be prepared to give up some of the autonomy they have
traditionally cherished.
VII. CONCLUSION
Gilson hypothesizes that attorneys add value to their client's trans-
actions by devising efficient governance structures. In the context of
his analysis the attorney's role is to devise optimal contract terms. But
if an attorney is to truly add value to his client's transaction then he
must recognize that clever contract drafting is but one alternative for
solving governance problems. Effective transaction cost engineering
requires a careful matching of governance structures to transaction
characteristics. The attorney must look to the characteristics of the
underlying transaction that make contracting costly and design gov-
ernance structures accordingly. Occasionally this will demand effi-
cient contract terms; but often the design of more complex governance
structures will be required. The attorney who fails to recognize that
contracts must be drafted with an eye to the accompanying govern-
ance structure not only fails as a transaction cost engineer, but can
contribute to the eventual demise or restructuring of the underlying
relationship.
I have illustrated some of the conditions under which a more com-
plex private orderings will be required. In the context of organizing
an IPA I have argued that uncertainty and complexity in the underly-
ing contracting, opportunistic conduct, and the extent to which invest-
ments are nonredeployable, makes specialized governance structures
necessary. These structures will be devised by the parties as part of
their ongoing relationships.
My argument strongly suggest that an attorney counsel his clients
that a contract document alone will not guarantee the success of an
enterprise. Simply because a group of doctors agrees to a set of con-
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tract terms does not mean that the HMO will be a success. The lawyer
must make clear to the parties that all contractual relationships re-
quire some method of enforcing, monitoring, and adapting the agree-
ments and he must be prepared to make concrete suggestions about
the specific methods of governing the transaction. This in turn re-
quires the lawyer to understand a good deal about his client's enter-
prise. Where the parties involved are, like physicians, not particularly
familiar with the role of business relationships the attorney's role be-
comes all the more important.54
54. Macaulay implicitly makes this same point. Macaulay, Non-Contractual Rela-
tions in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 at 61 (1963).
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